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THE PECULIAR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
STATUS OF HOSPITAL HOUSESTAFF
I. Introduction
In recent years confusion and controversy have existed regarding
the eligibility of hospital interns, residents and clinical fellows to
bargain collectively. While some state labor relations boards have
ruled that these housestaffl are employees, and thus eligible to bar-
gain collectively,2 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has
ruled that housestaff in private, non-profit hospitals are primarily
students, and thus, ineligible to bargain collectively.3 The NLRB
has further claimed that its ruling on the collective bargaining sta-
tus of housestaff in private, non-profit hospitals preempts any sub-
sequent consideration of the matter by state labor relations boards.4
The conflict over whether state labor relations law or the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)5 should determine the collective bar-
gaining status of housestaff in non-profit hospitals did not arise
until after 1974. Prior to this time, non-profit hospitals, the employ-
ers of housestaff, were exempted from the NLRB's jurisdiction.'
Consequently, states applied their own laws to labor-management
1. The term "housestaff" is commonly used when referring collectively to interns, resi-
dents and clinical fellows. Generally, interns have just completed medical school and are
involved in a one year program; residents are in a longer training program leading to certifica-
tion in a medical specialty; clinical fellows have completed residencies and are being trained
in medical sub-specialities. NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 566 F.2d 810, 811
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3541 (Feb. 28, 1978).
2. City of Cambridge and Cambridge Hosp. House Officers Ass'n, 2 M.L.C. 1450 (Mass.
1976), reprinted in Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) E-1 (May 24, 1976); Albert Einstein College
of Medicine of Yeshiva Univ., 33 S.L.R.B. 465 (N.Y. 1970); Bronx Eye Infirmary, Inc., 33
S.L.R.B. 245 (N.Y. 1970); Long Island College Hosp., 33 S.L.R.B. 161 (N.Y. 1970); Brooklyn
Eye and Ear Hosp., 32 S.L.R.B. 65 (N.Y. 1969).
3. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251, reconsideration denied, 224 N.L.R.B.
626 (1976). The Cedars-Sinai decision does not govern housestaff at public hospitals since
they are public employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Supp. V 1975).
4. See Kansas City Gen. Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. No. 14A, 93 L.R.R.M. 1362 (Nov. 8,1976)
[hereinafter cited as Kansas City II].
5. 29 U.S.C. 99 151-68 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V 1975).
6. Congress had amended the NLRA in order to exempt non-profit hospitals from the
NLRA's definition of employer: "The term 'employer' ... shall not include. . . any corpora-
tion or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual .... " Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §
101(2), 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970)).
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problems in non-profit hospitals,7 and a large number of state labor
boards concluded that housestaff, as employees, were eligible to
bargain collectively.' In August, 1974, however, Congress passed the
Health Care Amendments,9 deleting the NLRA exemption for non-
profit hospitals,' 0 and further extending the coverage of the Act to
include any "health care institution.""
The NLRB first considered the collective bargaining rights of
housestaff in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center.2 In finding housestaff
to be primarily students, rather than employees within Section 2(3)
of the NLRA,'3 the NLRB concluded that an organization composed
of housestaff was not a labor organization within the meaning of the
Act. 4 Accordingly, the NLRB dismissed the housestaff's petition for
certification as a labor organization. The NLRB has consistently
adhered to this view in cases involving housestaff in hospitals
throughout the country." Since this position is contrary to that
which many state courts and labor boards have adopted, two inter-
esting questions have emerged: (1) Has the NLRB preempted state
control of labor relations of housestaff in non-profit hospitals and (2)
7. Note, The 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Juris-
dictional Standards and Appropriate Bargaining Units, 5 Fordham Urb. L. J. 351, 352 (1977).
8. See note 2 supra.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152 (14), 153(c), 158(d)-(e), 158(g), (Supp. V 1975) (amending 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970)).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Supp. V 1975) removed the exemption for non-profit hospitals.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (14) (Supp. V 1975). The Act now states, "The term 'health care
institution' shall include any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organiza-
tion, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institutions devoted to the
care of the sick, infirm or aged person." Id.
12. 223 N.L.R.B. 251, reconsideration denied, 224 N.L.R.B. 626 (1976).
13. The Board found housestaff to be primarily students despite the lengthy and well
reasoned dissent of Member John Fanning.
14. If the housestaff are not considered employees within Section 2(3) of the NLRA, they
cannot be recognized as a labor organization under the Act. 223 N.L.R.B. at 254. The NLRA
states: "The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate ..... 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
15. 223 N.L.R.B. at 251. The NLRB stated: "No question affecting commerce exists
concerning the representation of employees of the Employer within the meaning . . . of the
Act . . . ." Id.
16. Wayne State Univ., 226 N.L.R.B. No. 168, 93 L.R.R.M. 1424 (Nov. 19, 1976); Buffalo
Gen. Hosp., 224 N.L.R.B. 76 (1976); University of Chicago Hosps. and Clinics, 223 N.L.R.B.
1032 (1976); Saint Clare's Hosp. and Health Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1976); Saint Christo-
pher's Hosp. For Children, 223 N.L.R.B. 166 (1976).
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if so, will the majority reasoning of Cedars:Sinai endure, despite the
dissatisfaction of state courts and agencies.
II. The Question of Preemption
A. A History of Confusion
A series of recent confrontations in the New York courts between
housestaff and hospitals illustrates the existing confusion and un-
certainty over whether the state or federal labor relations boards
may decide the collective bargaining rights of housestaff.
Prior to the 1974 Health Care Amendments, the State Labor Re-
lations Board of New York (SLRB) determined that housestaff of
non-profit hospitals could bargain collectively." The housestaff
were ruled employees under the New York State Labor Relations
Act,' and were held to constitute a union appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining.'9
Following the 1974 Health Care Amendments and the subsequent
Cedars-Sinai ruling that housestaff could not bargain collectively
under the NLRA, 0 New York's Misericordia Hospital refused to
bargain with the previously recognized Committee of Interns and
Residents (CIR).21 As the CIR was bringing an unfair labor practices
charge against Misericordia Hospital before the New York State
Labor Relations Board, the NLRB reiterated its Cedars-Sinai posi-
tion in Kansas City General Hospital." The SLRB then expressed
confusion about whether it had jurisdiction, and finally dismissed
the CIR's charges in Misericordia Hospital Medical Center.23 While
17. Albert Einstein College of Medicine of Yeshiva Univ., 33 S.L.R.B. 465 (N.Y. 1970);
Bronx Eye Infirmary, Inc., 33 S.L.R.B. 161 (N.Y. 1970); Long Island College Hosp., 33
S.L.R.B. 161 (N.Y. 1970); Brooklyn Eye and Ear Hosp., 32 S.L.R.B. 65 (N.Y. 1969).
18. N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 700-717 (McKinney 1977). Section 701(12) extends the coverage of
the New York State Labor Relations Act to "any person employed or permitted to work by
or at a non-profitmaking hospital or residential care center."
19. For example, the housestaff at Brooklyn Eye and Ear Hospital were found to represent
a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining under § 705(2) of the New York State
Labor Relations Act. Brooklyn Eye and Ear Hosp., 32 S.L.R.B. 65, 75 (N.Y. 1969).
20. 223 N.L.R.B. 251, reconsideration denied, 224 N.L.R.B. 626 (1976).
21. The Committee of Interns and Residents is an organization composed of housestaff
working in hospitals as interns, residents and clinical fellows [hereinafter cited as CIR].
22. Kansas City Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 92 L.R.R.M. 1379 (June 24, 1976), revised,
225 N.L.R.B. No. 14A, 93 L.R.R.M. 1362 (Nov. 8, 1976). In the Kansas City decision, the
NLRB also stated that the hospital involved was not even an employer under § 2(2) of the
NLRA. This addition was later deleted in the revised opinion, Kansas City II.
23. Misericordia Hosp. Medical Center, 39 S.L.R.B. No. 32 (July 14, 1976). Although the
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the CIR was attempting to vacate the SLRB's dismissal of its
charges, intervening hospitals sought to remove the action to federal
court.24 The District Court for the Southern District of New York,
however, found no federal jurisdictional basis for removal, and re-
manded the case to the New York State Supreme Court." On re-
mand, the New York Supreme Court 6 carefully considered the
Kansas City decision, 7 and concluded that "disputes between the
petitioner [CIR] and the intervening hospitals were unaffected by
the 1974 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act." 8 Con-
sequently the court held the SLRB should retain the same jurisdic-
tion it had possessed previously. 9
The NLRB quickly revised its Kansas City opinion in response to
the New York Supreme Court decision. In Kansas City H,3° the
NLRB explicitly stated that it had intended, by the Cedars-Sinai
opinion, "to find federal preemption of the health care field to pre-
clude states from exercising their power to regulate in this area."' 3'
The Board explained that the 1974 Health Care Amendments left
the resolution of whether housestaff were employees entitled to
collective bargaining rights to the discretion of the Board.32 In the
exercise of its discretion, the Board decided that affording house-
staff collective bargaining rights would be contrary to the national
labor policy. 33 Consequently, the New York Supreme court vacated
Board dismissed the CIR's petition, it stated, "The question of possible state jurisdiction here
is certainly not free from doubt. Cogent arguments can be, and have been made on both sides
of this issue. On balance, we have concluded that further processing of this matter before the
Board is not warranted at this time." Id.
24. Committee of Interns & Residents v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 420 F.
Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
25. Id.
26. Committee of Interns & Residents v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 88 Misc.
2d 502, 388 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1976), vacated, 89 Misc. 2d 424, 391 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup.
Ct. 1977).
27. Kansas City Hosp. 225 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 92 L.R.R.M. 1379 (June 24, 1976), revised,
225 N.L.R.B. No. 14A, 93 L.R.R.M. 1362 (Nov. 8, 1976).
28. Committee of Interns & Residents v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 88 Misc.
2d 502, 505-06, 388 N.Y.S.2d 509, 512 (Sup. Ct. 1976), vacated, 89 Misc. 2d 424, 391 N.Y.S.2d
503 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
29. Id.
30. 225 N.L.R.B. No. 14A, 93 L.R.R.M. 1362 (Nov. 8, 1976).
31. 93 L.R.R.M. at 1364.
32. Id.
33. Id. It is worth noting that Chairman Betty Murphey stated that although this was
not her intent at the time of the first Kansas City decision, she had now been persuaded that
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its previous determination34 that the State Board retained its juris-
diction over housestaff, dismissed the CIR petitions and declared
itself bound by the NLRB ruling on preemption in Kansas I.11
B. Initial Rejection of Federal Preemption Theory
In the interval between the two New York decisions, one granting
the SLRB jurisdiction over housestaff and the other denying it, the
NLRB, in an attempt to enforce its preemption ruling, brought an
action to enjoin the New York State Labor Relations Board from
continuing to assert jurisdiction over housestaff/hospital disputes."
The District Court for the Southern District of New York defined
the issue as "whether, given the Board's ruling that housestaff are
not 'employees' within the NLRA, the Board's further ruling in
Kansas City that the labor relations of housestaff are preempted by
the 1974 health care amendments from all state regulation is cor-
rect."37 After careful consideration, the court concluded that the
NLRA did not preempt the exercise of state power over labor rela-
tions of housestaff.35 Although the court declined to express an opin-
ion as to the NLRB's Cedars-Sinai determination that housestaff
are not employees under the NLRA,39 the opinion indicated a need
for some type of regulation of labor relations between housestaff and
hospitals. 0 By recognizing this need, and finding state regulation to
be more in harmony with national labor policy and congressional
intent than no regulation,4' the district court attempted to give
housestaff the collective bargaining rights denied them by the
NLRB.
The crucial issue about which the district court's reasoning re-
preemption was the effect of the Board's holding in the first Kansas City decision. Id. at 1364
n.6.
34. 88 Misc. 2d 502, 388 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1976), vacated, 89 Misc. 2d 424, 391
N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
35. 89 Misc. 2d 424, 391 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1977).
36. NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 426 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd,
566 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3541 (Feb. 28, 1978).
37. 426 F. Supp. at 449.
38. Before discussing the preemption issue, the court determined both that the NLRB had
authority to seek injunctive relief against preempted state action and that the district court
had proper jurisdiction over the subject matter. Id. at 444-45.
39. Id. at 449.
40. Id. at 453.
41. Id.
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volved was the original NLRB Cedars-Sinai holding that housestaff
are not employees within Section 2(3) of the NLRA. The district
court concluded that the NLRB, by making this determination, put
housestaff beyond the NLRB's power to control," even though Con-
gress had intended, by the Health Care Amendments to preempt
state regulation of the labor relations of such employees." Had the
NLRB ruled housestaff to be employees under the Act, labor dis-
putes between housestaff and private, voluntary non-profit hospi-
tals would have been within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction.44 But
since the NLRB made a contrary determination, the general expres-
sion of congressional intent to preempt state regulation would not
be dispositive.45
After determining that the NLRB had no jurisdiction over non-
employee housestaff, the district court focused on whether the fac-
tual pattern in the case at hand indicated a need for federal preemp-
tion.4" The court noted three particular factual situations which the
Supreme Court has identified as indicating the need for federal
preemption,47 and rejected all three as appropriate precedent for
federal preemption in the housestaff controversy.48
One of these factual patterns concerned Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
New York State Labor Relations Board,4" in which the Supreme
Court upheld the NLRB's refusal to designate foreman's bargaining
units as appropriate for bargaining purposes." In Bethlehem Steel,
preemption was ruled proper where the NLRB declined to exercise
its jurisdiction on the grounds that it would not effectuate the poli-
cies of the NLRA to do so." The district court, however, distin-
guished Bethlehem Steel as inapplicable to the housestaff fact pat-
42. The court stated: "The scope of the Board's power to interpret and administer the
Act must necessarily be limited by the boundaries of the Act itself." Id. at 450. The court
had earlier determined that it is within the power of the NLRB, as agent entrusted with
primary responsibility of administering and interpreting the Act, to make the initial interpre-
tation of the employee status of housestaff. Id. at 448-49.
43. Id. at 448.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 447.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
50. Id. at 775.
51. Id. at 774-75.
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tern.52 In Bethlehem Steel the NLRB had adequate jurisdiction over
the foreman involved because the Board termed them employees
under the NLRA, 3 whereas housestaff were not recognized as em-
ployees under the NLRA.
The district court discussed in considerably more detail a factual
pattern54 that occurs when the activity in question is neither pro-
tected nor prohibited by the Act, and when the national labor policy
requires the activity to be wholly unregulated and left to the free
play of economic forces." Although housestaff and their labor rela-
tions activities were neither protected nor prohibited by the Act
because of the NLRB's previous rulings, the court found that na-
tional labor policy did not require the activity to be wholly unregu-
lated." In rejecting federal preemption under this factual pattern as
inapplicable to the housestaff situations, the court focused on two
major considerations: (1) congressional intention underlying the
Health Care Amendments; and (2) the apparent rationale behind
the NLRB's ruling in Kansas City II.11
In exploring the first consideration, the court found that the gen-
eral purpose of the Health Care Amendments is "to insure continu-
ity of health care to the community."5 The Act was actually
amended to include non-profit hospitals because their earlier ex-
emption "had resulted in numerous instances of recognition strikes
and picketing."59 Congress believed that with procedures of the Act
52. NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 426 F. Supp. at 449-50.
53. At the time of the Bethlehem Steel case, the NLRB had concluded that supervisors
were employees within the meaning of the Act. It had also concluded as a matter of national
labor policy that unions of supervisors should not be given collective bargaining rights under
the Act. 330 U.S. at 775.
54. The district court dismissed the third factual pattern quickly as inapplicable to the
housestaff controversy. Under this third factual situation preemption is possible only in cases
where the activity involved is protected by § 7 (Rights of Employees) or prohibited by § 8
(Unfair Labor Practices), or arguably subject to either. Since housestaff are not employees
and therefore, by definition cannot be a labor organization under the NLRA, neither section
will apply to the instant case. NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 426 F. Supp. at
449.
55. Id. at 450.
56. Id. at 453.
57. Id. at 450.
58. Id. at 450 (construing S. REP. No. 93-766, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [19741
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3946, 3949).
59. 426 F. Supp. at 450 (construing S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3946, 3948).
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"available to resolve organizational and recognition disputes,"
strikes and picketing would no longer occur."' The district court
consequently concluded that Congress intended labor relations no
longer be left to the free play of economic forces." In further support
of this conclusion, the court noted that Congress had rejected pro-
posed amendments to the definition of supervisor that would ensure
housestaff would not be excluded as supervisors from coverage
under the NLRA. 2 Because Congress considered housestaff within
the scope of the Health Care Amendments, no special provision was
needed to ensure housestaff would not be excluded from the Act. 3
In exploring the second consideration, the court was apparently
influenced by both the Board's "precipitate" decision to revise the
original Kansas City opinion, 4 and the unclear language in Kansas
City II explaining the rationale behind the preemption decree. "5 In
Kansas City II the Board explained the rationale behind preemption
as follows:
"Having exercised its discretion in Cedars-Sinai, by finding residents, interns
and fellows to be primarily students and not 'employees' within the meaning
of the Act, the Board confirmed, in our view, that it has not put hospital
residents and interns beyond the reach of national labor policy, but has
rather held that to extend them collective-bargaining rights would be con-
trary to that very policy.',
The district court interpreted this language to mean that the Board
believed that students should not be afforded collective bargaining
rights, and should be unregulated by all labor law. 7 After surveying
a number of Board cases concerning bargaining rights of students, 6
however, the court concluded that there was no expression of na-
tional labor policy requiring students be denied collective bargain-
60. Id.
61. 426 F. Supp. at 451.
62. Id. (construing S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3951).
63. 426 F. Supp. at 451.
64. Id. Chairman Murphey and Member John Penello noted in the revised order: "The
preemption issue was never raised or litigated by the parties nor was it considered or even
contemplated by us in reaching our decision originally. 93 L.R.R.M. at 1364 n.6.
65. 426 F. Supp. at 452.
66. 93 L.R.R.M. at 1364.
67. 426 F. Supp. at 452.
68. Id.
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ing rights. 9 The court noted that the Board itself commented in the
Cedars-Sinai decision that students could be included in bargaining
units .71
C. Acceptance of Federal Preemption Theory
Writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Thomas
Meskill flatly rejected the two-pronged reasoning of the district
court, reversed the court's decision, and held that the NLRB had
properly preempted state jurisdiction over collective bargaining
rights of housestaff.7I Judge Meskill began his opinion by pointing
out that federal preemption in the labor field is particularly broad,
and that the case at hand did not fall within any of the few clear
exceptions and procedures delineated by Congress whereby the
NLRB may cede jurisdiction over labor disputes to appropriate
state authorities.72 He then systematically refuted the district
court's decision, first stating that the district court had relied upon
the distinction between employees and students made in the
Cedars-Sinai opinion as the "premise of a faulty syllogism."73 The
court of appeals described the district court's syllogism as follows:
If housestaff were not employees within the meaning of the NLRA,
then the CIR was not a labor organization; since the NLRA applies
only to labor organizations the Board has waived its jurisdiction
over housestaff.7' Judge Meskill pronounced this conclusion, that
the NLRB had waived its jurisdiction over housestaff, to be a con-
clusion contrary to the intent of both the NLRB and of Congress. 75
69. Id. The district court found that the Board, in a majority of cases, has not ruled that
students are not employees, but rather found that students did not have a sufficient com-
munity of interest with other regular employees to be included in the petitioned-for units.
Id.
70. Id. The Board in Cedars-Sinai stated: "We are aware that the Board has included
students in bargaining units and, in a few instances has authorized elections in units com-
posed exclusively of students." 223 N.L.R.B. at 253.
71. NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 566 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
46 U.S.L.W. 3541 (Feb. 28, 1978).
72. Id. at 812.
73. Id.
74. Id. The opinion stated the syllogism simply: "If housestaff were not 'employees' as
defined in Section 2(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Section 152(3), then the CIR was not a 'labor
organization' as defined in Section 2(5), 29 U.S.C. Section 152(5). Since the NLRA applies
only to a 'labor organization,' he [the district judge] concluded that the Board had waived
its jurisdiction over housestaff." Id.
75. Id. at 813.
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Judge Meskill first focused on the intent of the NLRB and its
power to prevent the states from granting collective bargaining
rights to housestaff unions." Because the NLRA contains explicit
procedures by which the NLRB can cede jurisdiction to state labor
authorities, the court of appeals refused to assume the NLRB would
do "implicitly" what it could have done "explicitly."77 As further
proof of the NLRB's intentions the court quoted precise language"
from the Kansas City II decision which held that extending collec-
tive bargaining rights to hospital residents and interns would be
contrary to the national labor policy.7" Thus the court relied on the
very language the district court had criticized, and concluded, con-
trary to the district court, that the NLRB retained jurisdiction over
housestaff.'
The court of appeals cited the Bethlehem Steel' case as precedent
to establish that the NLRB in fact had the power to assert its juris-
diction in the housestaff controversy, and then deny collective bar-
gaining rights to housestaff.52 The court of appeals disagreed with
the district court's prior interpretation of Bethlehem Steel as in-
applicable to the housestaff controversy," stating, "The inquiry is
not a narrow or technical one, but rather whether Congress intended
to occupy the field. The court must focus on the activity regulated
and determine if it has been broughtwithin the scope of federal
power.""'
Consequently, the court of appeals addressed the congressional
intention behind the Health Care Amendments, agreeing with the
district court that Congress intended to include all labor relations
of voluntary hospitals within the NLRA. 5 Thus, the court of appeals
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
79. 566 F.2d at 813. The district court had pronounced the Kansas City II decision
"precipitate" and unclear. See notes 63, 64 supra and accompanying text.
80. 566 F.2d at 813. The court did not discuss the district court's contention that extend-
ing collective bargaining rights to students is not contrary to national labor policy.
81. 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
82. 566 F.2d at 813-14. The court concluded that Bethlehem Steel was illustrative of state
power ousted by agency action taken pursuant to congressional mandate. Id. at 814.
83. See notes 49752 supra and accompanying text ..
84. 566 F.2d at 814.
85. Id. at 815.
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held that Congress intended to occupy this field.." When the NLRB,
the expert administrative agency to which Congress delegated pow-
ers over national labor policy, excluded housestaff from the defini-
tion of employee, it also denied them collective bargaining rights
under state law. 7
The district court, in recognizing a need for labor regulation of
housestaff, had settled for state regulation of the collective bargain-
ing rights of housestaff.5 The court of appeals, however, prohibited
state regulation under the Bethlehem Steel federal preemption
theory. 9 Furthermore, the court of appeals stressed that regula-
tions, if any, should be uniform. In keeping with this stated need
for uniform regulations, the court of appeals considered the possible
effects of a contrary holding, which Would allow for varying state
regulation of the collective bargaining rights of housestaff.9 1 The
court of appeals maintained: "If the NLRB erred in its treatment
of housestaff unions, the solution is clearly not to create a patchwork
of state-governed labor unions."92 The court envisioned that such a
patchwork could lead to at least three potential areas of conflict: (1)
conflict between the New York Labor Law which provides for com-
pulsory arbitration in labor disputes, and the NLRA which allows
strikes and collective bargaining, (2) conflict between the Health
Care Amendments which provide mechanisms for notice to be given
by unions with grievances and state law which makes no such provi-
sions, and (3) a jurisdictional conflict between the CIR and a union
recognized under the NLRA13 The court of appeals then simply
concluded that "the Health Care Amendments brought housestaff
within national labor policy. Accordingly, the district court's con-
clusion that the SLRB had jurisdiction over housestaff was erro-
neous and cannot stand."'"
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 426 F. Supp. at 453.
89. 566 F.2d at 816-17.
90. Id. at 815. Thus, the court of appeals quotes Senator Harrison Williams, chief sponsor
of the Health Care Amendments in the Senate: "ITihe general purpose of the National
Labor Relations Act, as interpreted by the Board and the courts, is to attempt to establish a
uniform pattern of collective bargaining rules nationwide, without local variation." 120 Cong.
Rec. 22575 (1974), quoted in 566 F.2d 810, 815.
91. 566 F.2d at 815-16.
92. Id. at 816.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 816-17.
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The court of appeals has ended the years of jurisdictional conflict
surrounding the housestaff/hospital management controversy. The
court addressed only the jurisdictional issue of preemption, how-
ever, and refused to consider the wisdom of the NLRB's Cedars-
Sinai decision. 5 The Cedars-Sinai decision denying housestaff certi-
fication as a labor organization, in conjunction with the court of
appeal's affirmation of the NLRB's power to preempt state control
of this field, leaves housestaff ineligible to bargain collectively as a
unit under the NLRA. By affirming the NLRB's power of preemp-
tion, the court of appeals perhaps properly isolated the original
Cedars-Sinai decision as the underlying problem."
III. The Cedars-Sinai Precedent
A. District Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Overturn Cedars-Sinai
In Physicians National Housestaff Association,9 the CIR recently
sought to overturn Cedars-Sinai as an abuse of discretion by the
NLRB. The housestaff plaintiffs petitioned the United States Court
for the District of Columbia to declare the plaintiffs a labor organi-
zation and employees within the meaning of the Act, and to order
the Board to assume jurisdiction over the housestaff on that basis."
Despite any possible problems with the Cedars-Sinai reasoning,
however, the district court declared both itself and the court of
appeals powerless to overturn that NLRB decision."
In Physicians National Housestaff Association, the district court
first explained that because the case involved representational mat-
ters, and not unfair labor practices, the court of appeals could not,
within the power granted it by the NLRA,'0 review the decision. 1'0
Although the NLRA does not provide for any kind of district court
review, the Supreme Court has authorized district court review of
representational matters in two types of exceptional circumstan-
ces: 9 2 (1) where the suit is not to review but to "strike down an order
95. Id.
96. Id. at 816.
97. No. 77-358 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 1978).
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id.
100. The United States Court of Appeals may review a final order of the NLRB which
involves the finding or allegation of an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
101. No. 77-358, slip op. at 3.
102. Id. at 5.
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of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to
a specific prohibition of the Act,"' 3 and (2) when a Board order
introduces a question of national import because of its international
implication. 04
The district court found only the first exception relevant,'05 and
then rejected its application to the housestaff dilemna, In Boire v.
Greyhound Corp.'°0 the Supreme Court stated that this first excep-
tion was a "narrow one, not to be extended to permit plenary district
court review of Board orders in certification proceedings whenever
it can be said that an erroneous assessment of the particular facts
before the Board has led it to a conclusion which does not comport
with the law."' 17 Adhering to the Supreme Court's direction in
Boire, '0 the district court dismissed the housestaff's request to be
recognized as a labor organization under the NLRA for want of
jurisdiction. 101 Since the court found no statutory mandate requiring
that housestaff be treated as employees within the meaning of the
Act,"10 the court reasoned that the NLRB ruling could not be consid-
ered contrary to a specific provision of the NLRA. Instead, because
such a decision was primarily a factual and definitional one, the
court held that it should be left to the discretion of the Board."'
Again the district court relied on Boire in which the determination
of employer status was considered to be a factual one." 2 The district
court found no distinction between the determination of employer
status and that of employee." 3
103. Id. at 4 (quoting Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958)).
104. Id. at 5 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineras de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10 (1963)).
105. No. 77-358, slip op. at 5.
106. 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
107. Id. at 481.
108. No. 77-358, slip op. at 6.
109. Id. at 7, 8.
110. Id. at 8. Plaintiffs here apparently argued that supervisors were not employees within
the meaning of the Act, and that housestaff had been excluded from the category of supervi-
sors by Congress. This indicated that housestaff were employees 'within the Act, and the
exclusion could serve as a statutory mandate of the NLRA violated by the NLRB decision,
Id. The district court found, however, that Congress had left "such a determination" to the
Board's case-by-case factual determination. Id. at 8 (construing S, REP. No. 93-766, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3946, 3951).
111. No. 77-358, slip op. at 8.
112. 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964).
113. No. 77-358, slip op. at 8.
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Despite its holding of lack of jurisdiction, the district court indi-
cated possible disagreement with the Cedars-Sinai decision."' The
court noted that it could not overturn the NLRB's choice "between
two fairly conflicting views, even though the court may have made
a different choice originally.""' Finally the district court implied
that the remedy lay with Congress."' The court again emphasized
that "regardless of the equities of the situation," if no congressional
mandate exists stating that housestaff are employees within the
meaning of the NLRA, then there is no violation of a mandatory
provision of the Act which would allow the district court jurisdic-
tion. 1,7
B. Initial State Precedent, Cedars-Sinai, and Subsequent State
Reaction
Because the district court declared itself powerless to overturn the
Cedars-Sinai decision, it did not analyze the reasoning behind that
NLRB holding. Yet the Cedars-Sinai holding, in conjunction with
the second circuit ruling that the NLRB has effectively preempted
state control of labor relations of housestaff, means that state labor
boards in the second circuit are effectively bound by the reasoning
of Cedars-Sinai."' State rulings, both prior and subsequent to
Cedars-Sinai, indicate strong disagreement between state authori-
ties and the NLRB with respect to the collective bargaining rights
of housestaff."51 Whether the solution lies with Congress' 0 as
Physicians National Housestaff Association implied, or with the
courts, the disagreement evidences a need for at least a discussion
of the differing viewpoints.
During the jurisdictional confusion, when states were unsure of
their power to deal with the housestaff controversy, state labor
boards and courts served as a testing ground for the soundness of
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See notes 70-95 supra and accompanying text.
119. See note 2 supra and note 122 infra.
120. The House Labor-Management Relations Subcommittee recently approved a bill to
extend NLRA coverage to medical interns and residents in the medical profession. Under the
subcommittee version, housestaff would constitute a bargaining unit separate from any exist-
ing unit of hospital employees. See LAB. L. RFP. (CCH) No. 295 (Feb. 24, 1978).
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the Cedars-Sinai reasoning. 2' Even courts grappling with the collec-
tive bargaining status of housestaff at public hospitals discussed the
Cedars-Sinai approach. 22 In New York, one federal judge strongly
suggested that if "Cedars-Sinai and its progeny survive federal
court review" the New York State Labor Board should follow the
decision since the New York State Labor Law was copied and
adapted from the federal statute."' Nevertheless, the nationwide
trend indicated state disagreement with the Cedars-Sinai reason-
ing.'24 Opposing viewpoints, still unresolved by a federal court due
to lack of jurisdiction to review Cedars-Sinai, rose and fell in prom-
inence during the confusion over jurisdiction.
Prior to the 1974 Health Care Amendments and the Cedars-Sinai
decision at least two states had ruled housestaff to be employees for
the purposes of collective bargaining.'1 In so holding, the New York
State Labor Relations Board reasoned that there were more similar-
ities between housestaff and other employees at a private, non-
profit hospital than between housestaff and fourth year medical
students.' 2 For example, the SLRB noted that fourth year medical
students must pay tuition, earn grades and are not licensed to prac-
tice medicine, while housestaff pay no tuition, earn no grades and
are licensed to practice medicine, at least at the hospital to which
121. See City of Cambridge and Cambridge Hosp. House Officers Ass'n, 2 M.C.L. 1450
(Mass. 1976), reprinted in Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) E-1 (May 24, 1976); House Officers
Ass'n for the Univ. of Neb. Medical Center and Affil. Hosps., 198 Neb. 697, 255 N.W.2d 258
(1977).
122. See note 3 supra. NLRB decisions, although not controlling in certain types of cases,
are still considered carefully. House Officers Ass'n for the Univ. of Neb. Medical Center and
Affil. Hosps., 198 Neb. 697, 702, 255 N.W.2d 258, 261 (1977). For example, in both Nebraska
and Michigan, if housestaff are employed or studying at a public hospital, as opposed to a
private, non-profit hospital such as Cedars-Sinai, a special court or agency may determine if
the housestaff are employees within the meaning of the appropriate law or Public Employ-
ment Relations Act. Regents of Mich. v. Employment Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96, 204
N.W.2d 218 (1973); House Officers Ass'n for the Univ. of Neb. Medical Center and Affil.
Hosps., 198 Neb. 697, 255 N.W.2d 258 (1977).
123. Comm. of Interns & Residents v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 420 F. Supp.
826, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Judge Charles Brieant made this statement during the controversy
between the CIR and various New York hospitals when the hospitals attempted to remove
the controversy to federal court. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted
that the New York State Labor Relations Act was copied and adapted from the 1935 federal
statute.
124. See note 121 supra.
125. Both New York and Michigan had taken this position. See note 2 and note 122 supra.
126. Long Island College Hosp., 33 S.L.R.B. 161, 169 (N.Y. 1970).
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they are assigned.'27 Like other employees, housestaff receive a sal-
ary, pay income and social security taxes, receive a paid vacation
and regular fringe benefits."8 While discussing these similarities
between housestaff and employees, the Board recognized the control
the hospital maintained over the housestaff.125 Because housestaff
were continuing their education while being employed, the state
board recognized a dual status of employee and student. 3 ° Accord-
ing to the SLRB, being a student did not negate the employment
relationship already present. '
A Michigan court,3 2 following a similar line of reasoning, found
housestaff of a public university hospital to be employees under the
Michigan Public Employment Relations Act, and thus eligible to
bargain collectively.'3 The court, however, did suggest the scope of
bargaining be limited if the subject matter fell clearly within educa-
tional spheres. 3 '
The NLRB in Cedars-Sinai came to a contrary determination by
emphasizing the primary relationship existingbetween the house-
staff and the hospital.'35 The Board based its decision on what it
127. Id.
128. Id. at 169-70.
129. Id. at 169.
130. Id. at 167.
131. Id. at 168.
132. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Employment Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96, 204
N.W.2d 218 (1973).
133. Id. at 112, 204 N.W.2d at 224-25.
134. Id. The court limited the scope of bargaining power because the University of Michi-
gan was considered to be a unique public employer, with responsibilities derived from the
constitution rather than from the acts of legislature. Thus, the court stated: "Some conditions
of employment may not be subject to collective bargaining because those particular facets of
employment would interfere with the autonomy of the Regents." Id. at 109, 204 N.W.2d at
224. In Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., the New York Public Employment Relations Board
also recognized that the collective bargaining process could be adjusted to accommodate any
special problems arising out of the dual capacity of housestaff. In that case, the housestaff,
already included in the hospital's white collar unit, petitioned the SLRB for recognition as
the exclusive negotiating representative of the hospital interns and residents. After first
recognizing the dual capacity of housestaff as employees and students, the Board noted that
any requirements fixed by state and professional certifications bodies could not be negotiated
by housestaff to the extent they "were fixed by authorities beyond the employer." The Board
stated, however, that although some educational requirements imposed by the employer as
educator might be beyond the scope of collective bargaining, there were duties "within the
control of the employer and within the scope of negotiations." [1976] 9 PuB. EMPL. REL. REP.
9-3029.
135. 223 N.L.R.B. at 253.
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termed a fundamental difference between an employment relation-
ship and an educational relationship, and chose to stress the educa-
tional nature of the interns', residents' and clinical fellows' experi-
ences." Defining the purpose of the internship and residency pro-
grams as programs designed "to put into practice the principles of
preventive medicine, diagnosis, therapy, and management of pa-
tients that the medical school graduate learned in medical
school,"'' the Board established the primary educational nature of
the housestaff program by examining the structure of the programs,
housestaff activities, salaries and tenure.' 8
The Board first established that housestaff attend graduate medi-
cal educational and training programs in order to qualify for licens-
ing and specialty certifications. 38 These training programs, gov-
erned by the American Medical Association and the National Board
of Medical Examiners, in addition to state boards, are usually con-
ducted according to guidelines published by the national organiza-
tions. 4 Hospitals running these programs must be accredited by
these associations.' Often, as at Cedars-Sinai, most of the hospital
staff physicians also hold appointments at nearby medical
schools.'42 Thus, the Board emphasized the teaching role of the hos-
pital staff physicians.' Furthermore, the NLRB characterized the
salary paid to housestaff not as compensation for services rendered,
but rather as a stipend for graduate study.' 4 In addition, the length
of the program each individual pursues, rather than any long-lasting
employment relationship, governs the tenure policies with the hos-
pital."1 The Board concluded that the combination of these factors
136. Id.
137. Id. at 251.
138. Id. at 251-54.
139. Id. at 251.
140. Id. at 252. "The standards for internships and residencies are contained in 'Essen-
tials of an Approved Internship' and 'Essentials of Approved Residences, . . . prepared by
the Council on Medical Education and approved by the American Medical Association." Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The two pamphlets prepared by the Council on Medical Education and approved
by the American Medical Association characterize the stipend as a scholarship for graduate
study. The Board noted that the amount of the stipend is determined by the housestaff
participant's level in the program, rather than by the number of hours worked. Id.
145. Id. at 252-53.
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established "an educational rather than an employment relation-
ship. 79146
Member (now Chairman) John Fanning, however, in a well rea-
soned and lengthy dissent, emphasized factors such as those pre-
viously detailed in the New York State Labor Board decisions.'47
Again, the dual student/employee status concept was relevant. He
stated, "The touchstone has always been whether the 'students'
were also employees."' 48 Member Fanning acknowledged that the
set of hospital guidelines, mentioned by the majority,"" did urge the
hospitals to view the primary effect of housestaff programs as educa-
tional. 50 He maintained, however, that the educational effect of the
programs had no bearing on the fact that housestaff, as employees,
receive compensation in return for performing a service for the hos-
pital. 5 ' Most importantly, he concluded that neither the language
of the statute'52 nor the intent of Congress' 3 indicated that house-
146. Id. at 254.
147. See notes 126-131 supra and accompanying text. Member Fanning discussed the
employee benefits the housestaff receive, the arduous and time consuming duties of house-
staff, and the large size of the stipend awarded specifically as compensation for services. As
further evidence of employment he noted that the hospital was liable for the acts of house-
staff. 223 N.L.R.B. at 255-56 (Fanning, Mem., dissenting).
148. Id. at 254 (Fanning, Mei., dissenting) (emphasis in original). He noted that
"Section 2(3) of the NLRA states that the term 'employee' is meant to 'include any employee
...unless the Act explicitly states otherwise,' and that 'students' are not listed among the
exceptions." Id., quoting National Labor Relations Act 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1970).
149. See note 140 supra.
150. 223 N.L.R.B. at 256 (Fanning, Mem., dissenting). He also, however, referred to a
memorandum distributed to all teaching hospitals by the American Medical Association on
Jan. 13, 1975, requiring that the agreement " 'provide fair and equitable conditions of
employment for all those performing the duties of interns, residents and fellows.' " Id., (Fan-
ning, Meri., dissenting) (quoting Guidelines for Housestaff Contracts or Agreements, Ameri-
can Medical Association House of Delegates, January 13, 1975).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 257. Member Fanning found that § 2(12) of the NLRA, designed to cover
professional employees, covered housestaff specifically. He found § 2(12)(b) to cover individu-
als who have completed specialized instruction and are performing related work under a
professional. Id. at 257-58. Professional is defined in 2(12)(a) as "any employee engaged in
work ... (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study
in an institution of higher learning or a hospital. ... 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970). The
majority apparently ruled out coverage of housestaff by § 2(12) because § 2(12) initially
defines a professional employee as "an employee, who .... " 223 N.L.R.B. at 253 n.4.
Since the majority found housestaff not to be employees within the general definition of
employee in § 2(3) of the Act, then they could not qualify as employees within § 2(12).
Member Fanning, however, believed the language in § 2(12) should help define the scope of
§ 2(3). Id. at 258 (Fanning, Mem., dissenting).
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staff should be excluded from coverage by the NLRA.'54
Several state courts considered the collective bargaining rights of
housestaff after the Cedars-Sinai decision, and before the court of
appeals decision holding that the NLRB had preempted the field.
For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed the Cedars-
Sinai reasoning in a decision concerning public employees.'55 The
court ruled that housestaff at a public hospital were not employees
under the Pennsylvania Public Employment Relations Act, and
consequently were not entitled to bargain collectively under the
provisions of the Act.' 5 Of the seven judges hearing the case, how-
ever, three vigorously dissented.' 7 Alternatively, the Massachusetts
Labor Commission which considered the issue subsequent to the
Cedar-Sinai decision, flatly rejected the NLRB's reasoning.'5 The
Massachusetts Labor Commission relied heavily on the dissenting
opinion of Member Fanning in Cedars-Sinai, and on pre-Cedars-
Sinai reasoning.'59
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in a recent ruling concerning
housestaff at a public hospital, indicated the growing dissatisfac-
tion with the Cedars-Sinai reasoning.16 0 In ruling housestaff of the
University of Nebraska Medical Center to be employees under
153. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text. Member Fanning advanced an argu-
ment similar to that of the district court with respect to congressional intent. He noted that
Congress, in response to the suggestion that housestaff would be excluded under the NLRA
as supervisors, commented that housestaff did not come within the NLRB's interpretation
of supervisor. Therefore Congress must have intended that housestaff not be excluded from
the Act. He also found no mention of the student status of housestaff in the congressional
debates bearing on the supervisor issue. 223 N.L.R.B. at 258 (Fanning, Mem., dissenting).
154. 223 N.L.R.B. at 257-59.
155. Philadelphia Ass'n of Interns & Residents v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 470 Pa.
562, 369 A.2d 711 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1976). Interestingly enough, this same court rejected as moot
the question of whether employees of a private, non-profit hospital were employees within
the meaning of the NLRA. The court regarded the Health Care Amendments as having
preempted housestaff/hospital relationships at private, non-profit hospitals. Id. at 566-67, 369
A.2d at 713.
156. 470 Pa. 562, 369 A.2d 711 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1976).
157. Chief Justice Michael J. Eagen stated that allowing the subjective motivation under-
lying the presence of housestaff at the hospital to preclude housestaff from being employees,
(as did Cedars-Sinai and the Pennsylvania court) would lead to absurd results. Id. at 571-
72, 369 A.2d at 716 (Eagen, C.J., concurring & dissenting).
158. City of Cambridge and Cambridge Hosp. House Officers Ass'n, 2 M.C.L. 1450 (Mass.
1976), reprinted in Gov'T EMPL. ReL. REP. (BNA) E-1 (May 24, 1976).
159. Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at E-4, E-5.
160. House Officers Ass'n for the Univ. of Neb. Medical Center and Affil. Hosps. v. Univ.
of Neb. Medical Center, 198 Neb. 697, 255 N.W.2d 258 (1977).
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state law, and therefore, eligible to bargaining collectively,' the
court cited many of the same employee indicators that the New
York Labor Relations Board and the Cedars-Sinai dissent con-
sidered.6 2 Although the court referred to the Cedars-Sinai decision,
it stated, "The great weight of authority has come to a contrary
decision to the Cedars-Sinai case."' 6 3
IV. Conclusion
The controversy over whether housestaff should be allowed certi-
fication to engage in collective bargaining has degenerated into a
war of language technicalities. While an employment relationship
between housestaff and hospitals is clearly the passkey to collective
bargaining rights, the question has centered around how much of an
employment relationship is needed to fit housestaff under the
NLRA definition of employee. Although the Cedars-Sinai dissent
argued that a dual student/employee role on the part of housestaff
was sufficient to bring housestaff within the NLRA's definition of
employee, the majority demanded that the employment relation-
ship be primary to the student relationship.
Both the district court and the court of appeals moved beyond
this technical argument in addressing the federal preemption issue
to discuss congressional purposes behind the Health Care Amend-
ments. The two courts, however, considered the Amendments pri-
marily in relation to the public need for uninterrupted health care,
and not in relation to any possible congressional recognition of the
needs of housestaff. Consequently, the court of appeals warned of
the potential state/federal conflicts a patchwork system of house-
staff unions could cause. Since only the federal preemption issue
was before the court, it left the substantive issue to the Physicians
National Housestaff Association case then pending before the
district court. When the district court dismissed that action for
lack of jurisdiction, discussion of the rights of housestaff to
bargain collectively failed to move beyond prior technicalities.
Consequently, no federal court has explored why housestaff may
161. Id. at 704, 255 N.W.2d at 259.
162. For example, the court considered the long hours housestaff must work, the income
and social security tax they pay, the paid vacations and fringe benefits they receive, and the
fact that they work under an employment contract. 198 Neb. at 699-701, 255 N.W.2d at 260-
61.
163. Id. at 702, 255 N.W.2d at 261.
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need collective bargaining rights. That such a need exists is evi-
denced by the strong dissent in Cedars-Sinai and both prior and
subsequent state decisions to allow housestaff bargaining rights.
This need should be balanced with the congressionally recognized
need of the public to have continuous health care. Clearly the court
system under the present NLRA is unable to reconcile these possi-
bly conflicting needs. Ultimately, aid to housestaff may lie with
Congress and its power to enact a statutory mandate definitively
proclaiming housestaff to be employees within the meaning of the
NLRA.
Diane Wende Bricker

